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INTRODUCTION
Because no federal statute expressly prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, lesbian, gay, and bisexual
(LGB) persons have long argued that anti-LGB bias should be actionable
under Title VII as a form of sex discrimination.1 This contention has
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia.
The author gratefully acknowledges receipt of funding for this project through a TerrySanford Research Award from the University of Georgia.
1. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979)
(observing that in three cases consolidated for appeal, the plaintiffs collectively argued “that
in prohibiting certain employment discrimination on the basis of ‘sex,’ Congress meant to
include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation”).
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generally been met with skepticism by courts, with judges often relying on a
narrow, biologically-based definition of “sex” and Congress’ repeated
failure to pass LGB-inclusive nondiscrimination legislation as confirmation
that Title VII does not afford a cause of action to LGB persons.2 The U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), moreover,
historically has taken the position that sexual orientation discrimination does
not constitute sex discrimination for the purposes of Title VII.3 Yet, in a
remarkable about-face, the EEOC recently reversed course and held that
Title VII does in fact prohibit discrimination on the basis of an individual’s
sexual orientation.
In Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC concluded that “sexual orientation is
inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’” such that “an allegation of
discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex
discrimination under Title VII.”4 The EEOC identified three possible
evidentiary routes by which LGB plaintiffs may prove that the relevant
conduct constituted actionable sex discrimination: first, the discrimination
involved treatment that would not have occurred but for the individual’s sex
(the but-for route); second, the discrimination was premised on the
fundamental sex stereotype that individuals should be physically and
emotionally attracted only to persons of the opposite sex (the genderstereotyping route); and third, the discrimination was based on the sex of the
persons with whom the individual associates (the associationaldiscrimination route).5 The EEOC has advanced the foregoing evidentiary
routes in two lawsuits in which it is serving as the plaintiff6 as well as in
several additional cases where the EEOC has submitted friend-of-the-court
briefs.7
2. See Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 290 (2014) (noting
that “[c]ourts initially commandeered decisions holding that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of ‘transsexualism’ to dismiss discrimination claims brought by
lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons.”).
3. E.g., Johnson v. Frank, EEOC Decision No. 05910858, 1991 WL 1189760, at *3
(EEOC Dec. 19, 1991).
4. EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (EEOC July 15, 2015).
5. Id. at *10.
6. See EEOC v. Scott Med. Ctr., 2017 WL 5493975 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2017) (entering
a Judgment Order for plaintiff); see also EEOC v. Pallet Co., No. 1:16-cv-595-CCB (D. Md.
June 28, 2016) (entering parties’ consent decree).
7. Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of
Plaintiff/Appellant and Reversal at 10-23, Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195
(2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-748) [hereinafter Christiansen Amicus Brief]; Brief of the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and in
Favor of Reversal at 11-24, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (No.
15-15234) [hereinafter Evans Amicus Brief]; Brief of the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Hively’s Petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 5-9, Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 2016 WL 6768628
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This Article examines the associational-discrimination route as a means
of securing employment protections for LGB persons and concludes that the
approach should be abandoned in favor of the but-for and genderstereotyping routes. Compared to these latter routes, the associationaldiscrimination route has three major flaws. First, although the circuit courts
are uniform in holding that race-based associational discrimination is
actionable under Title VII,8 the notion of associational sex discrimination has
been recognized by only one circuit, and that court’s reasoning is highly
suspect.9 The Supreme Court, moreover, has never recognized the validity
of associational discrimination theory in any context, race or otherwise.10
Consequently, in asserting that sexual orientation discrimination is
prohibited as a form of associational sex discrimination, plaintiffs are asking
courts to untether the concept of associational discrimination from its racial
moorings, expand the theory to include associational discrimination on the
basis of sex, and then interpret associational sex discrimination as precluding
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. For many courts, this
argument will likely prove a bridge too far.
Second, plaintiffs seeking to contest sexual orientation discrimination
as associational sex discrimination will likely have difficulty accessing the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.11 The
experiences of the first Caucasian plaintiffs to assert claims of associational
race discrimination are instructive. Courts once regarded Caucasian
plaintiffs’ allegations of associational race discrimination as disingenuous
attempts to exploit the protected class status of their African-American
associates.12 These courts routinely chastised Caucasian plaintiffs for
seeking to assert claims that were merely derivative of racial bias against
African-Americans.13 Although today it is generally understood that if a

(7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1720) [hereinafter Hively Amicus Brief].
8. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008); Tetro v. Elliott Popham
Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 1999);
Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1998); Drake
v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998); Parr v. Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986).
9. See infra pp. 33-41.
10. Depaula v. Easter Seals El Mirador, No. 14-CV-252, 2015 WL 12751708, at *6 (D.
N.M. Jan. 27, 2015).
11. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
12. See Parr v. United Family Life Ins. Co., No. C-83-26-6, 1983 WL 1774, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. June 15, 1983) (stating that “[t]he court therefore finds that [the Caucasian] plaintiff is
attempting to state a claim under Title VII based on the race of his [African-American]
wife.”).
13. See Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 209-10 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (finding
that “[w]hile the Court does not impugn the motives of the plaintiff, a holding which would
permit a white plaintiff to attack practices which allegedly disadvantage blacks would open
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Caucasian employee “is subjected to adverse action because an employer
disapproves of interracial association, the [Caucasian] employee suffers
discrimination because of the employee’s own race,”14 courts adjudicating
LGB plaintiffs’ claims of associational sex discrimination may default to the
reasoning of these earlier cases and hold that LGB plaintiffs cannot satisfy
the first element of McDonnell Douglas Corp. to the extent they are
ostensibly seeking to invoke the protected class status of their same-sex
associates.
Third, the associational-discrimination route stands to be underinclusive. To date, most of the cases finding an actionable claim of
associational discrimination have centered on relationships of a romantic or
familial nature between an associator and a specific associatee.15 Should this
trend carry over into the sexual orientation context, persons discriminated
against solely on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation
would lack any recourse under Title VII given that the discrimination they
suffered was status-based rather than the result of their intimate association
with an individual of a particular sex. This would have the practical effect
of conferring privileged status on persons in sexual orientation-consistent
relationships, notwithstanding the fact that an individual’s sexual orientation
and the sex of the persons to whom they are attracted would seem to be
inexorably intertwined. LGB persons, moreover, would be especially
vulnerable given that many of them are not out at work and thus cannot
acknowledge their involvement in a same-sex relationship to their
colleagues, a prerequisite to invoking the protections of associational
discrimination theory.16
Unlike associational discrimination, the but-for and genderstereotyping routes are grounded in Supreme Court precedent and have their
origins in the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence.17 Because the
inclusion of associational discrimination claims will only serve to undermine
these other arguments’ strength while introducing unnecessary confusion
into courts’ analyses, this article contends the EEOC and private litigants

Title VII to dangerous abuse” given that a Caucasian plaintiff would have “no personal
incentive to enforce the Act” but may instead have “an incentive to subvert [Title VII].”).
14. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008).
15. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 513 (6th Cir. 2009).
16. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, The Cost of the Closet and the Rewards of
Inclusion, 9 (2014).
17. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (recognizing the
gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination); City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (finding sex discrimination where “the evidence shows
‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different’”
(quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1205 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))).
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should rely exclusively on the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes to
prove that anti-LGB bias constitutes actionable sex discrimination. Part I
considers the literature’s treatment of associational sex discrimination
generally and its implications for LGB persons specifically. Part II examines
the EEOC’s initial rejection and subsequent recognition of associational sex
discrimination as a means of contesting sexual orientation bias in the
workplace. Part III demonstrates that associational sex discrimination
suffers from several major shortcomings, rendering it an imperfect vehicle
for securing sexual orientation-based employment protections. Part IV
contends that the associational-discrimination route should be abandoned in
favor of the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes given that these latter
methods are consistent with and reflective of established legal norms in the
area of sex discrimination.
I.

ASSOCIATIONAL SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE ACADEMIC
LITERATURE

The literature’s treatment of associational sex discrimination as a means
of redressing sexual orientation-based employment bias has been relatively
limited, with authors often pausing just long enough to note the theoretical
viability of such claims before returning to their primary theses.18 The dearth
of scholarly discourse in this area had the effect of relegating associational
sex discrimination to an academic afterthought throughout much of the
1990s and early 2000s, notwithstanding the corresponding surge in LGBoriented legal scholarship over that same timeframe.19 Indeed, it was not
until 2012 that a scholar by the name of Victoria Schwartz undertook a
serious examination of associational discrimination theory’s implications for
LGB persons, and her seminal piece — Title VII: A Shift from Sex to
Relationships20 — remains one of only a handful of articles to be published
18. E.g., Mark W. Honeycutt II & Van D. Turner, Jr., Comment, Third-Party Associative
Discrimination Under Title VII, 68 TENN. L. REV. 913, 928 (2001) (discussing briefly the
possibility of third-party associative discrimination claims based on same-sex partners before
returning to the main discussion of race based discrimination). But see Matthew Clark,
Comment, Stating a Title VII Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace:
The Legal Theories Available After Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313 (2003)
(providing a comparatively more thorough exploration of associational discrimination
theory’s implications for sexual orientation-based employment bias).
19. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and
Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 351 (1995) (“These . . . writings have produced a virtual explosion
of ideas in just a few years, creating a rich and expanding body of sexual orientation discourse
and scholarship for the first time in the history of American legal academia.”).
20. Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 209 (2012).
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in this area to date.21
Professor Schwartz begins her article by suggesting that the text of Title
VII is ambiguous insofar as associational discrimination is concerned.22 In
relevant part, Title VII provides “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . .
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”23
Schwartz contends that the foregoing passage is susceptible to two plausible
interpretations.24 Under the first reading, discrimination must be predicated
on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin independent
of and without reference to the individual’s interpersonal relationships.25
Under the second reading, discrimination may be based on an individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin when considered in relation to
and as informed by their interpersonal associations.26 Schwartz, therefore,
rejects the premise that associational discrimination theory is merely an ad
hoc judicial construct and instead argues that a relationally-oriented reading
of the passage is “entirely consistent with the text of Title VII.”27
After acknowledging that associational discrimination theory
originated and developed within the specific context of race discrimination,
Schwartz asserts there is nothing in Title VII’s text to suggest the theory
should be limited to the category of race: “[T]he statutory language ‘because
of such individual’s’ applies to each of the protected characteristics [set forth
in Title VII, meaning] the relational discrimination interpretation of that
phrase ought to apply equally to [the statute’s] other protected
characteristics . . . .”28 According to Schwartz, once courts recognize the
applicability of associational discrimination theory to claims of sex
discrimination, they necessarily must conclude that Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: “[S]exual orientation is an
inherently relational concept” in that a woman discriminated against for
being gay:
“is discriminated against for her sex (female) in relation to her
sexual relationships with others (female). Therefore, her claim for
discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation is necessarily
a claim that she is being discriminated against on the basis of her
21. E.g., Pierce G. Hand, IV, Note, Affiliative Discrimination Theory: Title VII Litigation
Within the Sixth Circuit, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541 (2016) (contending the Sixth Circuit
should recognize sexual orientation discrimination as associational sex discrimination).
22. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 216.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
24. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 216.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 221 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)).
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sex when viewed in relation to others.”29
The expansive view of associational discrimination endorsed by
Professor Schwartz is further apparent from her contention that a person need
not be in a sexual orientation-consistent relationship at the time of the alleged
discrimination to state a cognizable claim of associational sex
discrimination.30 She contends that “[a]n employer who is motivated by
animus based on an employee’s sexual orientation likely is so motivated
regardless of the specific status of that employee’s relationships.”31
According to Schwartz, it is the employee’s romantic association with
persons of the same sex generally rather than his or her relationship with any
individual specifically that is likely to engender animus on the part of the
employer.32
Schwartz, therefore, believes that associational sex
discrimination stands to provide meaningful employment protections to all
persons discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation, not just
those fortunate enough to be in romantic relationships at the time of the
discriminatory act.33
As discussed in Part III, however, Professor Schwartz ostensibly
provides an unduly optimistic assessment of associational sex discrimination’s potential efficacy in redressing sexual orientation-based
employment bias. First, courts will likely be hesitant to extend associa-tional
discrimination theory beyond its historic, race-based origins to include
matters of sex, much less construe associational sex discrimination as
precluding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Second, courts
adjudicating claims of associational sex discrimination will likely deny LGB
persons access to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas,
meaning direct proof of discrimination will be necessary to state a cognizable
Title VII claim. Third, courts will likely restrict associational sex
discrimination claims to persons who were known by their coworkers to be
in committed romantic relationships at the time of the alleged discrimination,
leaving single and closeted LGB individuals without any recourse. Before
examining the associational-discrimination route’s shortcomings in detail,
however, it is important to understand the theory’s evolution within the
EEOC.

29. Id. at 248. Whereas Schwartz’s analysis focuses exclusively on sexual orientation
discrimination directed against LGB persons, she makes a point to note that claims of
associational sex discrimination stand to be available to persons of all sexual orientations,
including heterosexuals. Id. at 250.
30. Id. at 249.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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THE EEOC AND ASSOCIATIONAL SEX DISCRIMINATION

For decades, neither the EEOC nor the courts had cause to consider the
application of associational discrimination theory in the specific context of
sex.34 When the EEOC was finally confronted with the issue in Cooke v.
Nicholson, the Commission’s analysis was complicated by the fact the
complainant/associator was a heterosexual man whereas the relevant
associatee was a homosexual woman.35 This initially led to the dismissal of
the complainant’s case on the grounds the harassment the complainant
suffered was predicated on the associatee’s sexual orientation rather than her
sex.36 On appeal, the complainant argued that he had been harassed because
he was willing to work with the only female in what was otherwise an allmale environment such that the associatee’s homosexuality was irrelevant
for the purposes of his associational discrimination claim.37
The
Commission, nevertheless, affirmed the final order dismissing the
complainant’s case38 and denied his subsequent request for reconsideration.39
Approximately one year later, the Commission sua sponte reconsidered
Cooke and held that claims of associational sex discrimination are cognizable
under Title VII.40 The Commission began by observing that Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination on the basis of an individual’s sexual orientation
and noted that at least some of the harassment the complainant endured
appeared to be the result of his association with a gay co-worker.41 As an
example, the Commission cited complainant’s receipt of a note implying that
he was gay and complainant’s belief the note stemmed from his cordial
relationship with a homosexual colleague.42 Conversely, the Commission
recognized that some of the harassment directed against the complainant was
the product of his association with a female co-worker, as reflected in the
rumors that he and the associatee were having a sexual affair.43 The case,
therefore, posed two interrelated questions: whether a sex discrimination
claim may be predicated on associational discrimination theory and, if so,
34. Andrew W. Powell, Is There a Future for Sex-Based Associational Discrimination
Claims Under Title VII?, LAB. LAW J. 9349634, 164, 166-68 (Fall 2015).
35. Cooke v. Nicholson, No. 05A60305, 2006 WL 842209, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 23,
2006).
36. Id. at *2-3.
37. Id. at *3.
38. Cooke v. Nicholson, No. 01A51683, 2005 WL 1073710, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 29,
2005).
39. Cooke v. Nicholson, No. 05A50929, 2005 WL 2428941, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 22,
2005).
40. Cooke, 2006 WL 842209, at *4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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whether such claims are rendered inactionable when accompanied by
instances of sexual orientation discrimination. Answering yes and no,
respectively, the Commission found that “if harassment was simultaneously
directed against the complainant both because of his association with [the
female associatee] because of her sexual orientation and gender, Title VII
still protects the gender basis.”44
Notwithstanding the Commission’s decision in Cooke, courts have been
hesitant to recognize claims of associational sex discrimination.45 Some
courts have intimated that while such claims may be cognizable in theory,
they fail as a practical matter.46 Other courts have cited a reluctance to confer
employment protections on LGB persons as their reason for rejecting
associational sex discrimination claims: “[T]he . . . novel theory that all
associational sex discrimination is barred as the analogue of interracial
relationship discrimination . . . proves too much and must be rejected” given
that “[a]dopting such a theory would serve to protect sexual orientation in
any context where sex discrimination is protected . . . .”47 Significantly, in
the decade following Cooke only one claim of associational sex
discrimination was able to withstand a defendant’s summary judgment
motion and only because the court implicitly assumed that both the male
associator and the female associatee were heterosexual.48 Thus, courts’
resistance to allowing claims of associational sex discrimination post-Cooke
was attributable — at least in part — to continuing concerns that recognition
of such claims would lead to protections for LGB persons.49
Ostensibly seeking to reinvigorate associational discrimination theory
within the courts while at the same time endeavoring to eliminate workplace
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, in 2015 the EEOC
44. Id. (citing Sexton v. Slater, No. 05970111, 1999 WL 433295 (E.E.O.C. June 17,
1999)).
45. Powell, supra note 34, at 169.
46. See Gallo v. W.B. Mason Co., No. 10-10618-RWZ, 2010 WL 4721064, at *1 (D.
Mass. Nov. 15, 2010) (“Assuming, arguendo, that Title VII prohibits gender-based
associational discrimination, Gallo’s complaint falls [sic] to state such a claim.”); Stezzi v.
Aramark Sports, LLC, No. 07-5121, 2009 WL 2356866, at *5 (E.D. Penn. July 30, 2009)
(“Here, there are . . . insufficient facts to persuade this Court to extend an associational
discrimination claim to the gender context.”).
47. Partners Healthcare Sys. v. Sullivan, 497 F. Supp. 2d 29, 39 (D. Mass. 2007).
48. Pratt v. Hustedt Chevrolet, No. 05-4148, 2009 WL 805128 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2009). See also Schwartz, supra note 20, at 254 (“[T]he district court accepted the relational
discrimination argument in the [presumably] heterosexual sexual orientation context, and was
able to avoid the bootstrapping arguments and legal stigma that would be triggered had the
plaintiff been homosexual.”).
49. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“It is clear . . . that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).
See also Schwartz, supra note 20, at 234-46 (discussing courts’ various rationales for
concluding that sexual orientation discrimination is outside the purview of Title VII).
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announced that sexual orientation discrimination is actionable under Title
VII as a form of associational sex discrimination.50 Specifically, in Baldwin
v. Foxx the Commission held that:
Sexual orientation discrimination is . . . sex discrimination
because it is associational discrimination on the basis of sex. That
is, an employee alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is alleging that his or her employer took his or her sex
into account by treating him or her differently for associating with
a person of the same sex. For example, a gay man who alleges that
his employer took an adverse employment action against him
because he associated with or dated men states a claim of sex
discrimination under Title VII; the fact that the employee is a man
instead of a woman motivated the employer’s discrimination
against him. Similarly, a heterosexual man who alleges a gay
supervisor denied him a promotion because he dates women
instead of men states an actionable Title VII claim of
discrimination because of his sex.51
The Commission indicated that the prohibition of sexual orientation
discrimination was a logical extension of its earlier decisions finding that
discrimination on the basis of an individual’s interracial relationships
constitutes actionable race discrimination, reasoning that “Title VII ‘on its
face treats each of the enumerated categories’ — race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin — ‘exactly the same.’”52 The Commission concluded by
asserting that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’
and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily
an allegation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”53
Whereas Baldwin only applies to the federal workforce,54 the
Commission has endeavored to extend the decision’s reach to the private
sector by filing two lawsuits challenging sexual orientation discrimination as
associational sex discrimination.55 In EEOC v. Scott Medical Center, the
Commission alleged that a male supervisor sexually harassed a gay
subordinate because he “objected generally to males having romantic and
sexual association with other males, and objected specifically to [the

50. Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).
51. Id. at *6.
52. Id. at *6-7 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243 n.9).
53. Id. at *5.
54. Ryan H. Nelson, Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII After Baldwin
v. Foxx, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 255, 256 (2015).
55. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Files First Suits
Challenging Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex Discrimination (Mar. 1, 2016),
available at https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-1-16.cfm [https://perma. cc/V
9G5-8P7F].
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subordinate’s] close, loving relationship with his male partner.”56 Similarly,
in EEOC v. Pallet Companies, the Commission alleged that a male
supervisor sexually harassed a lesbian subordinate because he “objected
generally to females having romantic and sexual association with other
females, and objected specifically to [the subordinate’s] close, loving
association with her female partner.”57 Although Pallet Companies
ultimately settled,58 Scott Medical Center resulted in a $55,500 judgment for
the plaintiff, but only after the defendant accepted a default judgment on the
question of liability.59
As amicus curiae, moreover, the EEOC has advocated the associationaldiscrimination route in three circuits60 wherein sexual orientation
discrimination has previously been deemed permissible under Title VII.61 In
its briefs, the Commission argues that the relevant circuit precedent is
outdated and unworkable.62 The Commission also contends that “[t]he
behavior of an employer that discriminates against a gay employee because
it disapproves of same-sex dating is not materially different from the
behavior of an employer that discriminates against an employee because it
disapproves of interracial dating,” given that “[i]n both cases, the employer
bases its actions on the protected characteristic of its employee, viewed in
relation to the individuals with whom that employee associates.”63 To date,
however, only one of the three aforementioned circuits has embraced
associational discrimination theory as a means by which LGB persons may
contest sexual orientation-based employment discrimination,64 and that

56. Complaint at 4-5, No. 2:16-cv-225-CB (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2016).
57. Complaint at 5, No. 1:16-cv-595-CCB (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2016).
58. EEOC v. Pallet Cos., No. 1:16-cv-595-CCB (D. Md. June 28, 2016) (order entering
parties’ consent decree).
59. EEOC v. Scott Med. Ctr., No. 2:16-cv-225-CB (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2017).
Separately, the associational-discrimination route has been endorsed by one U.S. circuit court.
Hively, 853 F.3d at 347-49.
60. Hively Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 6-7; Christiansen Amicus Brief, supra note 7,
at 18-20; Evans Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 19-22.
61. See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th
Cir. 2000) (“[H]arassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation (and
not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”); Simonton v.
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Title VII does not prohibit harassment or
discrimination because of sexual orientation.”); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938
(5th Cir. 1979) (“Discharge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII or Section
1981.”). Note that decisions issued by the Fifth Circuit prior to September 30, 1981 constitute
binding precedent within the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
62. Hively Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 4; Christiansen Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at
10.
63. Christiansen Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 20.
64. Hively, 853 F.3d at 347-49. Three-judge panels of the Second and Eleventh Circuits
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court’s reasoning is predicated on a false equivalence as discussed in greater
detail in Part III.
III.

ASSOCIATIONAL SEX DISCRIMINATION: AN IMPERFECT
MEANS OF REDRESSING SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED
EMPLOYMENT BIAS

Compared to the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes, the
associational-discrimination route stands to be over complex and under
inclusive as a means of redressing sexual orientation-based employment
bias. First, courts will likely be hesitant to expand associational
discrimination theory beyond its historic, race-based origins to combat
instances of sexual orientation discrimination. Second, plaintiffs seeking to
contest sexual orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex
discrimination will likely have difficulty accessing the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas. Third, courts willing to entertain claims
of associational sex discrimination will likely limit such claims’ scope to
persons who were in committed romantic relationships at the time of the
alleged discrimination. The EEOC and LGB plaintiffs should, therefore,
abandon the associational-discrimination route as a means of contesting
sexual orientation-based employment bias given that the inclusion of
associational discrimination claims will only serve to detract from the butfor and gender-stereotyping routes’ strengths while at the same time
affording courts hostile to LGB equality an opportunity to curtail the
associational-discrimination route’s efficacy via narrow, fact-restrictive
rulings.65

rejected LGB plaintiffs’ claims of associational sex discrimination after concluding that such
claims were barred by circuit precedent. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195,
199 (2d Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, No. 16-748 (2d Cir. June 28, 2017); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l
Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, No. 15-15234-BB (11th Cir. July
6, 2017), petition for cert. filed, 2017 WL 4022788 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2017) (No. 17-370).
65. The “strategic” manner in which courts have sought to limit LGB persons’ otherwise
actionable claims of sex discrimination is well-documented. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 19,
at 24 (“[C]ourts can and do (re)characterize sex and gender discrimination as sexual
orientation discrimination virtually at will. This practice employs sexual orientation to create
a loophole for sex and gender biases . . . .”). See also Alex Reed, Same-Sex Harassment After
Boh Brothers, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 441, 456-57 (2016) (observing that courts adjudicating
same-sex harassment claims have endeavored to limit the gender-stereotyping theory to the
facts of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins); Alex Reed, A Pro-Trans Argument for a
Transexclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 835, 852-53 (2013)
(acknowledging that although the gender-stereotyping theory “would seem to afford the
transgender community a ready means of securing employment protections under Title VII,”
courts historically have sought to limit the theory to the facts of Price Waterhouse).
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A. Expanding Coverage Beyond Race
Whereas the circuits are uniform in holding that race-based
associational discrimination is actionable under Title VII,66 the concept of
associational sex discrimination has been embraced by only one circuit,67 and
that court’s reasoning is highly suspect.68 The Supreme Court, moreover,
has never explicitly recognized the validity of associational discrimination
theory in any Title VII context, race or otherwise.69 Consequently, in
asserting that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited as a form of
associational sex discrimination, plaintiffs are asking courts to untether
associational discrimination theory from its racial moorings, expand the
theory to include discrimination on the basis of sex, and then interpret
associational sex discrimination as precluding discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. For many courts, this argument will likely prove a bridge
too far.70
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in DeSantis v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co. is instructive.71 Appellants in that case were a
group of LGB persons alleging they had been subjected to associational sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII.72 As paraphrased by the court,
“[a]ppellants argue that the EEOC has held that discrimination against an
employee because of the race of the employee’s friends may constitute
discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII” and “contend that
66. See supra note 8.
67. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349. The chief judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
endorsed the associational-discrimination route in a concurrence, however. Christiansen, 852
F.3d at 204 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring). Separately, the associational-discrimination route
has been endorsed by two district courts. E.g., Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., 221 F. Supp.
3d 255, 268 (D. Conn. 2016); Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1193-94
(M.D. Ala. 2015).
68. See infra pp. 33-41.
69. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex
Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 356 (2017)
(observing the Supreme Court did “not explicitly rely on the associational discrimination
argument” in a 1983 case involving sex discrimination but noting that “lower court decisions
since 1975 have all but uniformly interpreted Title VII to regulate discrimination because of
the race or ethnicity of one’s intimate associates”).
70. See Partners Healthcare Sys., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (“[T]he . . . novel theory that all
associational sex discrimination is barred as the analogue of interracial relationship
discrimination . . . proves too much and must be rejected” given that “[a]dopting such a theory
would serve to protect sexual orientation in any context where sex discrimination is protected,
including under Title VII and Amendment XIV analysis.”). See also Luke A. Boso, Acting
Gay, Acting Straight: Sexual Orientation Stereotyping, 83 TENN. L. REV. 575, 600-01 (2016)
(“What seems to trouble courts . . . is the number of links in the causal chain necessary to
arrive at the conclusion that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination.”).
71. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
72. Id. at 331.
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analogously discrimination because of the sex of the employees’ sexual
partner should constitute discrimination based on sex.”73 Although the Ninth
Circuit was prepared to “assum[e] that it would violate Title VII for an
employer to discriminate against employees because of the gender of their
friends,” the court declined to construe associational sex discrimination as
encompassing appellants’ claims of sexual orientation discrimination.74
Commentators have criticized DeSantis as deliberately distorting the
appellants’ claims in order to conclude that Title VII does not protect LGB
persons. Matthew Clark, for example, contends that “[b]y mischaracterizing
the associati[onal] discrimination theory as an inquiry into the sex of an
employee’s ‘friends,’ the Ninth Circuit . . . missed the point.”75 He explains
that to prevail on an associational discrimination claim, plaintiffs “generally
must show a very substantial relationship with the other person that is greater
than friendship.”76 Separately, Victoria Schwartz notes that “while the
court’s language is reminiscent of [associational] discrimination arguments,
its analysis shows that it misses the essence of those arguments.”77 Schwartz
explains that “it is not the sex of the third party that is the focus of the
analysis, but rather the sex of the employee viewed vis-à-vis the third party”
such that “[t]he Ninth Circuit never considers, much less rejects, this
properly understood [associational] discrimination argument.”78
Whereas these scholars’ criticisms are justified from a purely academic
standpoint, their contentions are irrelevant for the purposes of this Article.
DeSantis may be read as standing for one of two distinct propositions:
associational sex discrimination — by definition — does not encompass
discrimination on the basis of an individual’s same-sex romantic
relationships; or courts are so averse to providing redress for sexual
orientation-based employment discrimination that they are prepared to
mischaracterize LGB plaintiffs’ otherwise actionable claims of associational
sex discrimination. Under either interpretation, DeSantis highlights the risks
of advancing associational discrimination theory as a means of contesting
anti-LGB employment bias.
The associational-discrimination route’s flaws are evident not only in
the cases rejecting the route, but also in the cases embracing it. To date, the
only court to permit an explicit claim of associational sex discrimination is
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the opacity of the court’s analysis

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Clark, supra note 18, at 333-34.
Id. at 334.
Schwartz, supra note 20, at 252.
Id.
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suggests the theory is ill-suited for application in areas other than race.79 In
finding that the lesbian plaintiff stated a viable claim of discrimination on
the basis of her intimate association with a person of the same sex, the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that it had never before been confronted with
a claim of associational discrimination in any context, race or otherwise.80
The majority in Hively, nevertheless, proceeded to embrace a sweeping view
of associational discrimination whereby plaintiffs may state cognizable Title
VII claims on the basis of their relationships with persons belonging to any
of the statute’s explicitly enumerated categories.81
The majority predicated the associational discrimination portion of its
ruling on the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia, wherein
state miscegenation laws prohibiting interracial marriages were struck down
as violations of equal protection.82 The majority in Hively observed that:
These [miscegenation] laws were long defended and understood
as non-discriminatory because the legal obstacle affected both
partners. The Court in Loving recognized that equal application of
a law that prohibited conduct only between members of different
races did not save it. Changing the race of one partner made a
difference in determining the legality of the conduct, and so the
law rested on “distinctions drawn according to race,” which were
unjustifiable and racially discriminatory. So too, here. If we were
to change the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the
outcome would be different. This reveals that the discrimination
rests on distinctions drawn according to sex.83
Significantly, the majority did not address the fact that whereas Loving
entailed a constitutional challenge to racial discrimination in the context of
marriage, Hively concerned a statutory claim of sex discrimination in the area
of private employment. The Seventh Circuit instead declared that the “line
of cases [addressing associational discrimination] began with Loving” and
then proceeded to summarize several Title VII decisions applying
associational discrimination theory to instances of race discrimination.84
Throughout its opinion, the majority assiduously avoided any discussion of
how a theory originating under the Equal Protection Clause in the specific
context of race was applicable to a claim of sex discrimination arising under
79. Hively, 853 F.3d at 339.
80. Id. at 348. See also id. at 359 (Flaum, J., concurring) (“Although this Circuit has not
yet addressed whether claims based on a theory of associational discrimination are cognizable
under Title VII, I agree with the majority that . . . [t]his type of discrimination is prohibited
by Title VII.”).
81. Id. at 349.
82. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
83. Hively, at 348-49 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11).
84. Id. at 347-48.
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Title VII.85 This is likely because the court’s holding cannot be justified from
a constitutional standpoint given the differential treatment afforded race and
gender by the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.86 Rather, the
court engaged in analytic sleight of hand by focusing instead on the coequal
status of race and sex for the purposes of Title VII: “The fact that Loving
[and certain associational discrimination cases implicating Title VII] . . .
deal[t] with racial associations, as opposed to those based on color, national
origin, religion, or sex, is of no moment” because Title VII’s text “draws no
distinction . . . among the different varieties of discrimination it addresses.”87
The flaws in the majority’s rationale were laid bare in the dissenting
opinion authored by Judge Sykes. Regarding the issue of associational sex
discrimination, Judge Sykes refuted a central tenet of the majority’s
argument by rendering Loving inapposite:
Loving rests on the inescapable truth that miscegenation laws are
inherently racist. They are premised on invidious ideas about
white superiority and use racial classifications toward the end of
racial purity and white supremacy.
Sexual-orientation
discrimination, on the other hand, is not inherently sexist. No one
argues that sexual-orientation discrimination aims to promote or
perpetuate the supremacy of one sex. In short, Loving neither
compels nor supports the majority’s decision to upend the longsettled understanding that sex discrimination and sexualorientation discrimination are distinct.
For the same reason, the majority’s reliance on [precedent from
other circuits recognizing the viability of associational

85. See id. at 348-49 (discussing the rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Loving and declaring, “[s]o too, here”). The Supreme Court has indicated that its decisions
construing the Equal Protection Clause “are a useful starting point in interpreting” Title VII.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. See also Gutzwiller v.
Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that “the showing a plaintiff must make
to recover on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII mirrors that which must be made to
recover on an equal protection claim under section 1983.”). Consequently, the Supreme
Court’s differential treatment of race and gender in the equal protection context suggests that
courts adjudicating Title VII claims should be hesitant to extend associational discrimination
theory beyond its historic, race-based origins to encompass matters of sex discrimination. See
Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 171 (2016) (acknowledging
that under the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence “race is subject to the most
rigorous constitutional protection” as reflected by the fact racial classifications are accorded
strict scrutiny whereas “[s]ex is less suspect” such that classifications based on gender receive
intermediate scrutiny).
86. See supra note 85.
87. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243).
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discrimination claims in the context of race], which translated
Loving to the Title VII context, is entirely inapt. An employer who
refuses to hire or fires an employee based on his interracial
marriage is obviously drawing invidious racial classifications akin
to those inherent in Virginia’s miscegenation laws. Loving’s
equal-protection holding extends to Title VII racial-discrimination
claims because those claims share the same contextual foundation.
They arise in a nation whose original sin is slavery, where some
states sought to perpetuate white supremacy as recently as half a
century ago, and where the vestiges of this iniquitous history
persist in our workplaces and in other institutions of our society.
The Equal Protection Clause and Title VII’s prohibition of racial
discrimination in the workplace both operate to curtail the evil of
racism inherent in anti-miscegenation. That explains why Loving
applies to Title VII racial-discrimination claims but is not a
warrant for reading sexual-orientation discrimination into the
statute.88
Judge Sykes’ dissent, thus, exposes the major flaw in the majority’s
reasoning and highlights the difficulties LGB persons are likely to encounter
in contesting sexual orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex
discrimination.89 Whereas LGB plaintiffs may be tempted to draw parallels
between discrimination on the basis of race and sex in the hope of gaining
access to associational discrimination theory, the fact that race and sex
discrimination are readily distinguishable,90 particularly in the constitutional
context,91 suggests that LGB plaintiffs should be wary of advancing such
arguments as they would only serve to undermine the litigants’ credibility
88. Id. at 368-69. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. 2017) (arguing that “an employer who
discriminates against an employee in a same-sex relationship is not engaged in sex-based
treatment of women as inferior to similarly situated men (or vice versa), but rather is engaged
in sex-neutral treatment of homosexual men and women alike”); Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197,
201 (1994) (explaining that “the gravamen of Loving’s objection to the miscegenation
prohibition was that it was ‘designed to maintain White Supremacy.’”) (quoting Loving, 388
U.S. at 11).
89. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 258 (finding that “Loving is not directly relevant to
the argument” that sexual orientation discrimination should be actionable as a form of
associational sex discrimination given that “Loving involved a constitutional argument, and
sex and race are not treated identically in the constitutional context”).
90. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 88, at 21 (positing that
the “analogy to racial discrimination is fundamentally inapposite”).
91. See Leonore F. Carpenter, The Next Phase: Positioning the Post-Obergefell LGBT
Rights Movement to Bridge the Gap Between Formal and Lived Equality, 13 STAN. J. CIV.
RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 255, 265 (2017) (explaining that unlike classifications on the basis of
race and sex, the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that classifications on the basis of
sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny); supra note 85.
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and detract from more persuasive arguments as to why sexual orientation
discrimination is actionable under Title VII.92
B. Demonstrating Membership in a Protected Class
Additionally, if history is any guide, plaintiffs seeking to contest sexual
orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex discrimination will
have difficulty accessing the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.93 McDonnell Douglas allows plaintiffs to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by proving “(1) membership in a
protected class; (2) qualification for the position; (3) an adverse employment
action; and (4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on
the basis of membership in the protected class.”94 Once a plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
“produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was
preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”95 If the employer
satisfies this requirement, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove
92. To date, the District of Colorado is the only federal district court to explicitly apply
associational discrimination theory in a setting other than race and did so in the context of
discrimination on the basis of national origin rather than sex. Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist.,
618 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1985). The court begins by noting, “the EEOC has found that
reasonable cause existed to believe that an employer violated Title VII by discharging an
employee because of his or her association with people of a different race” and references two
Commission decisions standing for that proposition. Id. at 1460 (citing EEOC Decision No.
71-1902, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1244 (1971) and EEOC Decision No. 71-909, 3 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 269 (1970)). Without citing any additional authority or providing
any further explanation, however, the court then characterizes these decisions as “indicat[ing]
that the EEOC interprets Title VII as prohibiting discriminatory employment practices based
on an individual’s association with people of a particular race or national origin.” Id. Thus,
in failing to elucidate how the Commission’s rulings in the area of associational race
discrimination support its conclusion that claims of national origin-based associational
discrimination are actionable under Title VII, the court declined to try to situate associational
discrimination theory within the broader framework of Title VII.
93. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
94. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 2008). See also McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802 (articulating the Supreme Court framework requiring that a plaintiff show:
“(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant’s qualifications”).
But see Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 202 (2009) (recognizing that “the original McDonnell
Douglas formulation was so fact-specific that it has applied to almost no actual cases”).
95. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (quoting Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
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that the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual.96 As noted by Victoria
Schwartz, “[g]iven this framework, the first prong of the plaintiff’s prima
facie case — the ability to establish membership in a protected class — holds
the key to the entire burden-shifting kingdom,”97 and it is here that plaintiffs
contesting sexual orientation discrimination as associational sex
discrimination are likely to have their claims derailed in a manner analogous
to the first plaintiffs alleging associational discrimination in the context of
race.
Courts confronted with allegations of associational race discrimination
once routinely dismissed such claims on the grounds that the Caucasian
plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the first prong of McDonnell Douglas, i.e.,
membership in a protected class.98 These courts regarded Caucasian
plaintiffs’ allegations of associational race discrimination as attempts to
establish a prima facie case, not based on the plaintiffs’ own protected class
status, but instead based on the protected class status of their AfricanAmerican associates.99 This understanding is revealed in various statements
to the effect that “[p]laintiff does not contend that he has been discriminated
against because of ‘his’ race” but instead “contends that he has been
discriminated against because of the race of his wife,”100 and “plaintiff’s
complaint does not allege that he was denied employment because of his
race” but “because he is married to a black female.”101 Although today it is
generally understood that “an employer may violate Title VII if it takes
action against an employee because of the employee’s association with a
person of another race,”102 courts adjudicating LGB plaintiffs’ claims of
associational sex discrimination may default to the reasoning of these earlier
cases and hold that LGB plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first prong of
McDonnell Douglas.
Indeed, courts have already demonstrated a willingness to dismiss
otherwise viable claims of associational sex discrimination brought by
96. Ricci, 530 F.3d at 110.
97. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 215.
98. See, e.g., Adams v. Governor’s Comm. on Postsecondary Educ., No. C80-624A,
1981 WL 27101, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981) (stating that “[p]laintiff does not contend that
he has been discriminated against because of ‘his’ race” as a Caucasian person, rather “[h]e
contends that he has been discriminated against because of the race of his [African-American]
wife”).
99. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and
the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 948 (2007); Noah D. Zatz,
Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND.
L. J. 63, 100 (2002).
100. Adams, 1981 WL 27101, at *3.
101. Parr v. United Family Life Ins. Co., No. C-83-26-6, 1983 WL 1774, at *1 (N.D. Ga.
June 15, 1983).
102. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008).
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heterosexual men on the grounds that they failed to establish membership in
a protected class. In Stezzi v. Aramark Sports, LLC, the court characterized
the plaintiff’s claim of associational sex discrimination as follows: “Because
[p]laintiff, a white male, is not a member of a protected class, he attempts to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination through his association with
Ms. Risica,” a female co-worker with whom the plaintiff had become
romantically involved.103 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he had been
harassed by a male supervisor because he was dating a woman to whom the
supervisor was sexually attracted.104 The court ultimately found that “[t]he
facts relied upon by [p]laintiff have nothing to do with his gender, but rather,
revolve around his relationship with Risica, and, in turn, her relationship with
[the supervisor].”105 Consequently, the court granted summary judgment for
the defendant on the grounds the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was
harassed because of “his own gender” and therefore could not satisfy the first
prong of McDonnell Douglas.106
The fact that heterosexual plaintiffs have struggled to state viable
associational discrimination claims on the basis of sex does not bode well
for LGB individuals seeking to contest sexual orientation bias as a form of
associational sex discrimination. Historically, when confronted with LGB
persons’ otherwise actionable claims of sex discrimination, courts have
seized on the plaintiffs’ same-sex attraction as proof that, in reality, plaintiffs
were attempting to bootstrap sexual orientation protection into Title VII.107
This trend is likely to continue in the context of LGB persons’ claims of
associational sex discrimination. Indeed, whereas in Stezzi the court made
no mention of the parties’ respective sexual orientations but instead simply
assumed that all of the parties were heterosexual,108 a court adjudicating a
claim of associational sex discrimination brought by an openly LGB person
would likely be “hyperaware” of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.109
Presumably, this would lead the court to abstain from the sort of detailed —
albeit questionable — analysis set forth in Stezzi in favor of summarily
rejecting the plaintiff’s claim as an attempt to amend Title VII by judicial
fiat.110
If such a claim were to receive a court’s reasoned consideration,
moreover, the result would likely be the same as in Stezzi or any of the early
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

No. 07-5121, 2009 WL 2356866, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2009).
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Alex Reed, Redressing LGBT Employment Discrimination via Executive Order, 29
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 133, 155 (2015).
108. Stezzi, 2009 WL 2356866, at *4-5.
109. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 211.
110. Id. at 211, 255.
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associational race discrimination cases. If, for example, a man was to bring
a Title VII claim against his employer alleging that he had been fired for
marrying another man, a court might well reject his claim on the grounds he
“does not contend that he has been discriminated against because of ‘his’
[sex]” but instead “contends that he has been discriminated against because
of the [sex] of his [spouse].”111 Even if the plaintiff took pains to characterize
his claim as alleging discrimination on the basis of his own sex, male, when
viewed in relation to the sex of his male spouse, a court might nonetheless
seize on his spouse’s alleged gender nonconforming appearance or behavior
to hold that “[t]he facts relied upon by [p]laintiff have nothing to do with his
gender, but rather, revolve around his relationship with [his same-sex
spouse], and, in turn,”112 his same-sex spouse’s alleged failure to comport
with male gender norms.113
Additionally, LGB plaintiffs’ ability to establish a prima facie case may
depend on the sex of the associator and associatee. In the preceding
hypothetical wherein the plaintiff and spouse are both men, a court might
begin its analysis by noting that “[b]ecause Plaintiff, a . . . male, is not a
member of a protected class, he attempts to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination through his association with [his spouse].”114 The court
presumably would then observe that in this case, however, the relevant
associatee is also male such that the plaintiff cannot rely on his spouse’s sex
to establish membership in a protected class. A court adjudicating a case of
this sort would likely stress that whereas prior associational discrimination
claims have been characterized by an associator of a different race or sex
than the relevant associatee, here the plaintiff and spouse are both men.115
Although this distinction would apply with equal force if the associator and
associatee were both female, a court may be more inclined to permit a claim
of associational sex discrimination by a lesbian given that she would likely
111. Adams, 1981 WL 27101, at *3.
112. Stezzi, 2009 WL 2356866, at *5.
113. This scenario presumably would not constitute associational sex discrimination
given that the plaintiff’s sex is not being considered in relation to the sex of his spouse, but
rather the spouse’s sex is being considered independent of and without reference to the
plaintiff’s own sex.
114. Stezzi, 2009 WL 2356866, at *4.
115. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, Public
Advocate of the United States, and United States Justice Foundation in Support of Appellees
and Affirmance at 11, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. July 26, 2017)
(“In the race case, the associational theory applies only to an employee who is
associated with a person of another or different race, whereas in the sex case, the
associational theory is applied only when the person is in a relationship with a
person of the same sex . . . Thus, the two cases are not analogous.”).
See also Clark, supra note 18, at 329-31 (observing that employment discrimination on the
basis of interracial or opposite-sex relationships is actionable under Title VII).
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be deemed a member of a protected class both in her own right and in relation
to her female spouse. While the logic underlying the foregoing analysis is
admittedly tortured, history suggests that such holdings are not only possible
but indeed probable based on courts’ initial reluctance to allow claims of
associational race discrimination by Caucasians and more recent hesitance
to permit claims of associational sex discrimination by heterosexuals.116
LGB plaintiffs, therefore, should be wary of contesting sexual
orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex discrimination for
two reasons.
First, courts adjudicating LGB plaintiffs’ claims of
associational sex discrimination may invoke the reasoning of the early
associational race discrimination cases to deny LGB plaintiffs access to the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. Second, even if courts
are otherwise receptive to sex-based associational discrimination claims,
LGB plaintiffs’ ability to establish a prima facie case may hinge on the sex
of the relevant associator and associatee.
C. Proving a Sufficiently Substantial Relationship
Contesting sexual orientation bias as a form of associational sex
discrimination is also problematic from the standpoint that it promises to be
under-inclusive. To date, most of the cases finding an actionable claim of
associational discrimination have centered on relationships of a romantic or
familial nature between an associator and a specific associatee.117 Should
this trend carry over into the sexual orientation context, persons
discriminated against solely on the basis of their sexual orientation —
whether heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual — would be left without any
recourse under Title VII given that the discrimination they suffered was
ostensibly status-based rather than the result of their intimate association
with an individual of a particular sex.118 This would have the practical effect
116. See generally Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
101, 107 (2017) (“Protected class reasoning must be overcome for the view that anti-LGBT
discrimination is sex discrimination to gain wide acceptance.”).
117. Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513. See also Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of
Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605, 646 (2017) (“[F]ew jurisdictions will recognize the claim
where the association is a strong coworker relationship rather than a family relationship.”).
118. See Evans, 850 F.3d at 1258-60 (Pryor, J., concurring) (rejecting plaintiff’s
contention that “a person who experiences discrimination because of sexual orientation
necessarily experiences discrimination for deviating from gender stereotypes” after
concluding that “a claim of gender nonconformity is a behavior-based claim, not a statusbased claim”). But see Schwartz, supra note 20, at 249 (arguing that “[a]n employer who is
motivated by animus based on an employee’s sexual orientation likely is so motivated
regardless of the specific status of that employee’s relationships” such that the employee
should be permitted to state a viable claim of associational sex discrimination on the basis of
her LGB status alone).
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of conferring privileged status on persons known by their coworkers to be in
sexual orientation-consistent relationships at the time of the alleged
discrimination.
LGB persons stand to be particularly vulnerable to this “singles
loophole” given that many of them are not out at work and those who are out
in the workplace are statistically less likely to be married than their
heterosexual counterparts. Studies indicate that fifty-three percent of LGB
persons actively conceal the fact that they are homosexual or bisexual from
their work colleagues.119 This includes disavowing romantic interest in
persons of the same sex generally as well as hiding the fact that they are
currently dating persons of the same sex or are in a committed relationship
with a person of the same sex specifically.120 Despite their best efforts,
however, these persons may still be suspected of being homosexual or
bisexual and find themselves subjected to discrimination on that basis.121
Associational discrimination theory would not provide these individuals
with a viable cause of action because the discrimination they suffered would
have been based on their perceived sexual orientation rather than any actual
same-sex relationships. Given that avoiding sexual orientation-based
discrimination is one of the most common reasons for remaining closeted in
the workplace,122 yet acknowledging one’s same-sex relationships to one’s
coworkers is a necessary prerequisite to stating a cognizable claim of
associational sex discrimination, associational discrimination theory
threatens to leave more than half of the LGB community in an intractable
catch-22.
Simply coming out would not guarantee LGB persons employment
protections, however, as even individuals who are honest about their sexual
orientation and known by their coworkers to be in a committed same-sex
relationship may struggle to state a viable associational discrimination claim
unless they have solemnized their relationship via a legal marriage.
Although two circuits have held that the degree of association between an
associator and associatee is irrelevant,123 the cases in which other circuits

119. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., supra note 16, at 9.
120. Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for True
Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 60 n.51
(1993).
121. See, e.g., Evans, 850 F.3d at 1251 (observing that although plaintiff “did not
broadcast her sexuality” in the workplace, her coworkers suspected she was a lesbian based
on her failure to conform to female stereotypes and harassed her on that basis).
122. Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Documented Evidence of Employment Discrimination
& Its Effects on LGBT People, WILLIAMS INST., 13 (July 2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.uc
la.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-Mallory-Discrimination-July-20111.pdf [https://perma.cc/4
YDD-U2CP].
123. Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513; Drake, 134 F.3d at 884.
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have found an actionable claim of associational discrimination have centered
on relatively substantial relationships such as marriage.124 Should courts
adjudicating claims of associational sex discrimination import this
substantiality requirement into their analyses, a valid same-sex marriage may
be necessary to state a cognizable claim.125 Such a requirement would place
a disproportionate burden on LGB persons given that same-sex marriage
rates are significantly lower than opposite-sex marriage rates. Indeed,
whereas approximately fifty percent of adult heterosexuals are married,126
the marriage rate for LGB adults is under ten percent.127 Thus, LGB persons
are five times less likely than heterosexuals to be married, making it difficult
for LGB plaintiffs to prove that their relationships are of a sufficiently
substantial nature to sustain a claim of associational sex discrimination.
LGB plaintiffs, therefore, should be hesitant to contest sexual
orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex discrimination for
three reasons. First, closeted LGB persons would be left without recourse
since any discrimination they might suffer on the basis of their perceived
sexual orientation would be status-based rather than the result of their
intimate association with an individual of a particular sex.128 Second, even
124. See Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513 (“[I]n many of the cases that have found actionable
associational discrimination, the relationship at issue has been one that extended outside the
place of employment, such as a familial or romantic relationship.”). See also Clark, supra
note 18, at 334 (“[T]o state a claim of associative discrimination, a plaintiff generally must
show a very substantial relationship with the other person that is greater than friendship.”).
125. See Zielonka v. Temple Univ., No. Civ. A. 99-5693, 2001 WL 1231746, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 12, 2001) (observing that “[t]he cases in which courts have recognized a cause of
action under Title VII [for associational discrimination] have typically involved more
substantial relationships” such as marriage). Significantly, whereas the panel decision in
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College noted that “[a] number of courts have found that Title
VII protects those who have been discriminated against based on interracial friendships and
other associations” as support for its contention that “[t]he relationship in play need not be a
marriage to be protected,” comparable language is missing from the en banc decision.
Compare 853 F.3d 339, 347-49 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc), with 830 F.3d 698, 716 (7th Cir.
2016).
126. Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/data-trend/societyand-demographics/marriage/ [https://perma.cc/Z766-VHSX] (last visited Aug. 2, 2017).
127. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriages Up One Year After Supreme Court
Verdict, GALLUP (June 22, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/193055/sex-marriages-oneyear-supreme-court-verdict.aspx [https://perma.cc/8G3C-7U3Q] (observing that the
percentage of LGBT adults in same-sex marriages increased from 7.9% in the first half of
2015 to 9.6% in the second half of 2015 but then essentially remained unchanged at 9.5% as
of June 2016, “suggest[ing] there was a burst of same-sex marriages in the first few months
after the Supreme Court ruling [legalizing same-sex marriage] but little additional increase
since then”).
128. See Brief of the Defendant-Appellee Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind. at 19, Hively v.
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1720) (“Factually, there is nothing
in the District Court record suggesting that [plaintiff] associated with anyone — regardless of
race, gender, sexual orientation, or otherwise. Thus, there is no basis for any sort of
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if they are out to their coworkers, single LGB persons would be unable to
attain relief given that they were not in a same-sex relationship at the time of
the alleged discrimination. Third, LGB persons known by their coworkers
to be in committed same-sex relationships may be unable to state a viable
claim of associational sex discrimination unless they have solemnized their
relationship via a legal marriage.129
The existence of two other compelling, comparatively straightforward
arguments as to why discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
constitutes actionable sex discrimination only serves to underscore the
severity of the associational-discrimination route’s flaws.
Unlike
associational discrimination theory, moreover, these alternative arguments
stand to protect all LGB persons, not just those fortunate enough to be in
committed same-sex relationships at the time of the alleged discrimination.130
Because the inclusion of associational discrimination theory threatens to
undermine these other arguments’ strength and introduce unnecessary
confusion into courts’ analyses, the EEOC and LGB plaintiffs should rely
exclusively on the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes as discussed in
greater detail in Part IV.
IV.

THE BUT-FOR AND GENDER-STEREOTYPING ROUTES AS
PREFERRED MEANS OF SECURING LGB EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTIONS

The associational-discrimination route is not the only means of
contesting sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII. Rather, it is but
one of three routes by which persons discriminated against on the basis of
sexual orientation may establish a cognizable claim of sex discrimination.
The remaining routes rely on established Supreme Court precedent to show
that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination in that
“it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of the
employee’s sex”131 in contravention of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart;132 and “it necessarily involves discrimination based on
associational claim here.”).
129. See supra pp. 22-23 and notes 124-25.
130. See En Banc Brief of Christian Legal Soc’y & Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals as Amici
Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance at 12, Zarda v. Altitude Express,
Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775) (“It would be a large stretch . . . to a new rule
barring discrimination based on merely hypothetical relationships, and it would be highly
undesirable to create a situation under which a court would have to enquire whether the
plaintiff actually was in — and the defendant actually knew about — a relationship with an
individual of the same sex.”).
131. Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5.
132. 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (“Such a practice does not pass the simple test of whether
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gender stereotypes”133 in violation of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.134
Because the inclusion of associational discrimination claims stands to
undermine the legitimacy of these latter routes — while at the same time
affording courts hostile to LGB equality an opportunity to recognize claims
of associational sex discrimination only to then construe such claims
narrowly in a manner precluding relief135 — the EEOC and private litigants
should abandon the associational-discrimination route as a means of
contesting anti-LGB employment bias.
A. The But-For Route136
The simplest, most direct means of demonstrating that sexual
orientation discrimination constitutes actionable sex discrimination is via the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Manhart.137 There, the Court articulated a “simple
test” for evaluating claims of sex discrimination: “[W]hether the evidence
shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex
would be different.’”138 Over the past forty years, the Court has invoked the
but-for route to find actionable sex discrimination in a variety of contexts,
including circumstances where employers require female employees to make

the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would
be different.’”) (quoting Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
133. Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7.
134. 490 U.S. at 251 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group . . . .”).
135. See supra note 65.
136. To be clear, “but-for causation is not the test” in archetypal Title VII cases where
“[i]t suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s
motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the
employer’s decision.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013). The
author’s decision to refer to this method as the “but-for route” should not be interpreted as
advocating for the imposition of a more demanding causation standard for sexual orientationbased discrimination claims, but rather reflects a desire to utilize terminology consistent with
the standard as articulated by the EEOC. See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (“An
employee could show that the sexual orientation discrimination he or she experienced was
sex discrimination because it involved treatment that would not have occurred but for the
individual’s sex.”). See also Brief of Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 5 n.4, Zarda v. Altitude Express,
Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775) (“While a plaintiff satisfying Manhart’s ‘butfor’ test necessarily satisfies Title VII’s causation requirement, Title VII plaintiffs may also
prevail based on ‘the less stringent “motivating-factor” test.’”) (quoting Zarda v. Altitude
Express, 855 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2017)).
137. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
138. Id. at 711 (emphasis added) (quoting Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1205 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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larger pension contributions than their male peers,139 provide married male
employees with health insurance coverage for dependents that is less
inclusive than the dependency coverage furnished to married female
employees,140 and implement fetal protection policies barring women of
childbearing age from certain jobs.141 Thus, whereas the associational
discrimination theory has never been recognized by the Supreme Court in
any context, race or otherwise, the but-for route has its origins in the Court’s
sex discrimination jurisprudence and has been reaffirmed by the Court on
numerous occasions.
The appeal of the but-for route as a means of contesting sexual
orientation discrimination is evidenced by the fact that, unlike associational
discrimination theory, it had already been embraced by several courts prior
to receiving the EEOC’s endorsement in Baldwin.142 The first and most
significant of these decisions was issued by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon in 2002.143 There, the employer moved for summary
judgment on the grounds the discrimination was predicated on the plaintiff’s
sexual orientation rather than her sex, as reflected by her supervisor’s
repeated use of the terms “fag” and “homo” when referring to the plaintiff.144
Whereas most courts of this era would have seized on the sexual orientationrelated aspects of the case to conclude that the lesbian plaintiff was
attempting to bootstrap sexual orientation protection into Title VII,145 neither
the plaintiff’s acknowledged homosexuality nor the defendant’s use of antigay slurs prevented the court from considering whether the plaintiff had
adduced sufficient evidence to support a claim of sex discrimination.146 In
139. Id.
140. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683-84
(1983).
141. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991).
142. See Hall v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C13-2160, 2014 WL 4719007, at *3 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 22, 2014) (“Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment based on his sex, not his sexual
orientation, specifically that he (as a male who married a male) was treated differently in
comparison to his female coworkers who also married males.”); Heller v. Columbia
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223 (D. Or. 2002) (“A jury could find that
[the supervisor] would not have acted as she (allegedly) did if Plaintiff were a man dating a
woman, instead of a woman dating a woman. If that is so, then Plaintiff was discriminated
against because of her gender.”). See also Foray v. Bell Atl., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329-30
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (observing that the gay “[p]laintiff’s chief argument, that ‘but for’ his sex,
he would not have been discriminated against, is supported by legal theorists and [related state
case law],” but dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII claim because he was unable to show that he
had been “treated differently from ‘similarly situated’ persons of the opposite sex”).
143. Heller, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1215-16.
144. Id. at 1216-18, 1222.
145. See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality & Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 207
n.17 (2009) (collecting cases).
146. Heller, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23.
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denying the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the court held that “[a]
jury could find that [the supervisor] would not have acted as she (allegedly)
did if [p]laintiff were a man dating a woman, instead of a woman dating a
woman,” in which case the plaintiff “was discriminated against because of
her gender.”147 Having received the backing of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Oregon, the but-for route was subsequently adopted by the
District of Washington in 2014148 and the EEOC in 2015.149
The but-for route’s popularity has only grown following the EEOC’s
ruling in Baldwin.150 Significantly, several courts embracing the route postBaldwin have done so in a footnote or string citation rather than in the main
body of the opinion.151 These courts seem to regard the route’s applicability
as a foregone conclusion not warranting detailed analysis. Similarly, some
courts have adopted the but-for route without citing to any legal authority for
support, apparently perceiving the route as following naturally from the
statutory text.152 Thus, the somewhat perfunctory manner in which courts
have gone about recognizing the but-for route within the past few years
suggests the route is increasingly viewed as an obvious, non-controversial
means by which LGB persons may contest instances of sexual orientation
discrimination.
Of the cases to embrace the but-for route within the last few years, none
is more significant than the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in
Hively.153 There, the Seventh Circuit adopted the but-for route in three
succinct sentences:

147. Id. at 1223.
148. Hall, 2014 WL 4719007, at *3.
149. Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5.
150. See Isaacs, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1193 (“This court agrees . . . with the view of the
[EEOC] that claims of sexual orientation-based discrimination are cognizable under Title
VII.”). See also Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 203-04 (Katzmann, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]f gay,
lesbian, or bisexual plaintiffs can show that ‘but for’ their sex they would not have been
discriminated against for being attracted to men (or being attracted to women), they have
made out a cognizable sex discrimination claim.”) (citation omitted); Evans, 850 F.3d at 1271
n.16 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (“When an employer discriminates against a woman because
she is sexually attracted to women but does not discriminate against a man because he is
sexually attracted to women, the employer treats women and men differently ‘because of . . .
sex.’”); Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
(demonstrating a Title IX case which relies on Title VII law to hold that “Plaintiffs have stated
a straightforward claim of sex discrimination under Title IX” because “[i]f Plaintiffs had been
males dating females, instead of females dating females, they would not have been subjected
to the alleged different treatment”).
151. Isaacs, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1194; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1271 n.16 (Rosenbaum, J.,
dissenting).
152. See, e.g., Evans, 850 F.3d at 1265 n.9 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (failing to cite
legal authority for the but-for route).
153. 853 F.3d at 339.
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Hively alleges that if she had been a man married to a woman (or
living with a woman, or dating a woman) and everything else had
stayed the same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her
and would not have fired her . . . This describes paradigmatic sex
discrimination . . . Ivy Tech is disadvantaging her because she is a
woman.154
Compared to the rationale accompanying the court’s endorsement of
the associational-discrimination route,155 the analysis accompanying its
adoption of the but-for route is both concise and coherent. Consequently,
Hively is significant to the extent it highlights both the associationaldiscrimination route’s weaknesses as well as the but-for route’s strengths.
Given the but-for route’s appeal both before and after Baldwin, as most
recently exemplified by Hively, courts will likely be more receptive to the
but-for route as a means by which LGB persons may contest sexual
orientation-based employment bias than to the associational-discrimination
route. Unlike associational discrimination theory, application of the but-for
route to instances of sexual orientation discrimination does not require the
doctrine’s expansion beyond its historic origins. Nor is the but-for route
encumbered by precedent potentially restricting the doctrine’s scope to
persons in committed romantic relationships or by otherwise limiting
persons’ ability to access the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas. Rather, the but-for route requires only a literal application of the
“simple test” announced in Manhart: “[W]hether the evidence shows
‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be
different.’”156
B. The Gender-Stereotyping Route
Whereas the but-for route arguably represents the simplest and most
direct means of contesting sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII,
the gender-stereotyping route is the method most likely to be embraced by
154. Id. at 345.
155. See supra pp. 14-16.
156. 435 U.S. at 711 (quoting Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). See
also Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5
(“[A]ssume that an employer suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a photo
of her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for
displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk. The lesbian employee in
that example can allege that her employer took an adverse action against her that
the employer would not have taken had she been male.”);
Koppelman, supra note 88, at 208 (“If a business fires Ricky . . . because of his sexual
activities with Fred, while these actions would not be taken against Lucy if she did exactly
the same things with Fred, then Ricky is being discriminated against because of his sex.”).
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courts.157 The gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination has its
origins in Price Waterhouse, wherein the Supreme Court famously declared:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group, for “in forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”158
Because employers discriminating against LGB persons on the belief
that men should be attracted exclusively to women and women should be
attracted exclusively to men are, at bottom, insisting that LGB persons match
the stereotype associated with their sex, Price Waterhouse dictates that
sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination for the purposes of
Title VII.159 Although LGB persons advancing this argument historically
have enjoyed limited success,160 courts are increasingly inclined to construe
the gender-stereotyping theory as prohibiting discrimination against sexual
minorities.161
The appeal of the gender-stereotyping route as a means of contesting
sexual orientation discrimination is evidenced by the fact that — unlike
associational discrimination theory — it had already been embraced by
several courts prior to receiving the EEOC’s endorsement in Baldwin v.
Foxx.162 The most noteworthy of these pre-Baldwin decisions was issued by
157. Unlike the associational-discrimination and but-for routes, the gender-stereotyping
route has not been explicitly rejected by any court following the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin.
See Smith v. City of Pleasant Grove, No. 2:16-cv-00373-JEO, 2016 WL 5868510, at *6 n.4
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 2016) (rejecting the associational-discrimination route); Winstead v.
Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1344 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (rejecting
the but-for route).
158. 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13).
159. See Zachary A. Kramer, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing GenderConforming and Gender Non-Conforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
465, 479 (2004) (“No longer constrained to only sex-based claims, Hopkins enabled plaintiffs
to raise gender-based claims [under Title VII] that focus instead on an employer’s
stereotypical conceptions of the sexes.”).
160. Reed, supra note 2, at 291-94.
161. See Reed, supra note 65, at 853-55 (observing courts are increasingly likely to regard
discrimination against transgender persons as actionable sex discrimination).
162. See Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds the plaintiff, a gay man, stated a cognizable
claim of sex discrimination by alleging that his “sexual orientation is not consistent with the
Defendant’s perception of acceptable gender roles”); Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., No.
3:13CV1303, 2014 WL 4794527, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2014) (holding that a lesbian
plaintiff “has set forth a plausible claim she was discriminated against based on her nonconforming gender behavior” to the extent she “stated that the discriminatory conduct
commenced after certain individuals became aware of her sexual orientation and that she was
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the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 2014.163 There, the
employer moved to dismiss a gay man’s gender-stereotyping claim on the
grounds the plaintiff failed to allege that his “supervisor’s [discriminatory]
conduct was motivated by judgments about plaintiff’s behavior, demeanor
or appearance” and because there were “no facts to support an allegation that
the employer was motivated by his views about [p]laintiff’s conformity (or
lack thereof) with sex stereotypes.”164 In denying the motion, the court held
that the plaintiff met his pleading burden by alleging that he was “a
homosexual male whose sexual orientation is not consistent with the
[d]efendant’s perception of acceptable gender roles” such that his “status as
a homosexual male did not conform to the [d]efendant’s gender stereotypes
associated with men.”165 This marked the first time that an LGB person’s
gender-stereotyping claim was able to withstand a motion to dismiss where
the plaintiff’s allegations focused exclusively on his status as a homosexual
rather than his observable behavior or appearance in the workplace.166
subjected to sexual stereotyping during her employment on the basis of her sexual
orientation”); Heller, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (“[A] jury could find that [the supervisor]
repeatedly harassed (and ultimately discharged) Heller because Heller did not conform to [the
supervisor’s] stereotype of how a woman ought to behave. Heller is attracted to and dates
other women, whereas [the supervisor] believes that a woman should be attracted to and date
only men.”).
163. Terveer, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 116.
164. Id. at 115-16.
165. Id. at 116.
166. Kerry Eleveld, Title VII Awakening, ADVOCATE (July 15, 2014), http://www.advoc
ate.com/print-issue/current-issue/2014/07/15/title-vii-awakening [https://perma.cc/6CFE-CK
SS].
Several circuit courts and numerous district courts have held that the genderstereotyping theory affords protection to LGB persons who are discriminated against on the
basis of their gender nonconforming appearance or behavior as observed in the workplace.
See Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 201 (finding that plaintiff, an openly gay man, stated a
cognizable claim of sex discrimination by alleging that he was perceived as “effeminate and
submissive” by his coworkers and harassed on that basis); Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254-55
(granting a lesbian plaintiff leave to amend her complaint so that she may “provide enough
factual matter to plausibly suggest that her decision to present herself in a masculine manner
led to the alleged adverse employment actions”); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d
285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing summary judgment for defendant on the grounds plaintiff,
an openly gay man, presented sufficient evidence of gender stereotyping-based harassment to
the extent plaintiff “acknowledged that he has a high voice and walks in an effeminate
manner” and “discussed things like art, music, interior design, and décor” with his coworkers).
These courts often note that LGB persons’ failure to conform to gender stereotypes
vis-à-vis their romantic partners cannot give rise to a cognizable Title VII claim. See, e.g.,
Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 201 (“[B]eing gay, lesbian, or bisexual, standing alone, does not
constitute nonconformity with a gender stereotype that can give rise to a cognizable gender
stereotyping claim.”). See also Thompson v. CHI Health Good Samaritan Hosp., No.
8:16CV160, 2016 WL 5394691, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 27, 2016) (“While a significant amount
of case law following Price [Waterhouse v. Hopkins] included the discrimination of gay or
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Application of the gender-stereotyping route has increased dramatically
following the EEOC’s ruling in Baldwin v. Foxx.167 Several courts adopting
the route post-Baldwin have sought to expand upon the EEOC’s contention
that sexual orientation discrimination necessarily entails discrimination on
the basis of gender stereotypes. Specifically, these courts have shown that
attempts to draw distinctions between an LGB individual’s gendernonconforming status and gender-nonconforming behavior are unworkable
from a practical, textual, and doctrinal standpoint such that discrimination
predicated on a person’s LGB status is — by itself — sufficient to sustain a
lesbian plaintiffs, these types of claims are only successful if the plaintiffs can carve out
discrimination based upon sexual stereotypes from discrimination based upon their sexual
orientation.”).
Nevertheless, the fact that these courts have demonstrated a willingness to entertain
sex discrimination claims brought by LGB persons suggests that they and other courts may
be inclined to adopt the EEOC’s more expansive view that “[s]exual orientation
discrimination . . . necessarily involves discrimination based on gender stereotypes.” Baldwin
v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015). Indeed, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed to rehear a case en banc to determine whether
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is actionable under Title VII as a form of sex
discrimination. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017).
167. See Winstead v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1346 (N.D.
Fla. 2016) (“This view — that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is necessarily
discrimination based on gender or sex stereotypes, and is therefore sex discrimination — is
persuasive to this Court, as it has been to numerous other courts and the EEOC.”); Scott Med.
Health Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 842 (“[D]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a
subset of sexual stereotyping and thus covered by Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination
‘because of sex.’”); Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1194 (M.D. Ala.
2015)
(“To the extent that sexual orientation discrimination occurs not because of the
targeted individual’s romantic or sexual attraction to or involvement with people
of the same sex, but rather based on her or his perceived deviations from
‘heterosexually defined gender norms,’ this, too, is sex discrimination, of the
gender-stereotyping variety.” (quoting Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7-8)).
See also Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 206 (Katzmann, C.J., dissenting)
(“Thus, in my view, if gay, lesbian, or bisexual plaintiffs can show that they were
discriminated against for failing to comply with some gender stereotype,
including the stereotype that men should be exclusively attracted to women and
women should be exclusively attracted to men, they have made out a cognizable
sex discrimination claim.”);
Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting)
(“Plain and simple, when a woman alleges, as [plaintiff] has, that she has been
discriminated against because she is a lesbian, she necessarily alleges that she has
been discriminated against because she failed to conform to the employer’s image
of what women should be — specifically, that women should be sexually
attracted to men only.”);
Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[D]iscrimination
based on gender stereotyping encompasses sexual orientation discrimination.”).
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gender stereotyping claim.168 Similarly, the emerging consensus that
discrimination against transgender persons is, by definition, discrimination
on the basis of gender stereotypes has been shown to apply with equal force
in the sexual orientation context such that anti-LGB bias, like anti-trans bias,
is invariably predicated on gender stereotypes.169
Of the cases recognizing the gender-stereotyping route within the last
few years, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Hively v. Ivy
Tech Community College once again proves the most significant.170 There,
the majority relied exclusively on Title VII precedent to justify its adoption
of the gender-stereotyping route:
Viewed through the lens of the gender non-conformity line of
cases, Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to
the female stereotype (at least as understood in a place such as
modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and
other forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual.
Our panel described the line between a gender nonconformity
claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin; we
conclude that it does not exist at all. Hively’s claim is no different
from the claims brought by women who were rejected for jobs in
traditionally male workplaces, such as fire departments,
construction, and policing. The employers in those cases were
policing the boundaries of what jobs or behaviors they found
acceptable for a woman (or in some cases, for a man).
This was the critical point that the Supreme Court was making in
[Price Waterhouse v.] Hopkins . . . And even before Hopkins,
courts had found sex discrimination in situations where women
were resisting stereotypical roles. As far back as 1971, the
Supreme Court held that Title VII does not permit an employer to
refuse to hire women with pre-school-age children, but not men.
Around the same time, [the Seventh Circuit] held that Title VII
“strikes at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes” and struck down a rule
requiring only the female employees to be unmarried. In both
those instances, the employer’s rule did not affect every woman in
the workforce. Just so here: a policy that discriminates on the basis
of sexual orientation does not affect every woman, or every man,
but it is based on assumptions about the proper behavior for
someone of a given sex. The discriminatory behavior does not
168. E.g., Winstead, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 1345-46. See also Evans, 850 F.3d at 1267-68
(Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1265-69; Winstead, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 1345-46.
170. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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exist without taking the victim’s biological sex (either as observed
at birth or as modified, in the case of transsexuals) into account.
Any discomfort, disapproval, or job decision based on the fact that
the complainant — woman or man — dresses differently, speaks
differently, or dates or marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction
purely and simply based on sex. That means that it falls within
Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination, if it affects
employment in one of the specified ways.171
Compared to the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for endorsing the
associational-discrimination route,172 the analysis accompanying the court’s
adoption of the gender-stereotyping route is both logical and coherent. Thus,
Hively is significant to the extent it highlights both the gender-stereotyping
route’s strengths and the associational-discrimination route’s weaknesses.
In light of the gender-stereotyping route’s popularity both before and
after Baldwin — as most recently illustrated by Hively — courts will likely
be more receptive to the gender-stereotyping route as a means by which LGB
persons may contest sexual orientation-based employment discrimination
than they would the associational-discrimination route. Compared to
associational discrimination theory, application of the gender-stereotyping
route to instances of sexual orientation discrimination does not require the
doctrine’s expansion beyond its historic origins. Nor is the genderstereotyping route burdened by precedent potentially restricting the
doctrine’s scope to persons in committed romantic relationships or otherwise
limiting persons’ ability to access the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas. Rather, the route merely requires recognition of the
fact that LGB persons contravene the “ultimate gender stereotype,”173 i.e.,
opposite-sex attraction.
CONCLUSION
On September 26, 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals convened
a rare en banc sitting to hear argument on the following question: “Does Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation through its prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . .
sex’?”174 Whereas to date the appellant/employee has relied on the
associational-discrimination route to prove that the anti-LGB bias he

171. Id. at 346-47 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971)).
172. See supra pp. 33-41.
173. Kramer, supra note 159, at 490.
174. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017) (granting en
banc review).
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endured constitutes actionable sex discrimination,175 this article contends that
he should abandon the associational-discrimination route in favor of
proceeding under the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes.
The associational-discrimination route’s flaws are apparent from a
review of the appellant’s own legal briefs. Specifically, the appellant
acknowledges that the Second Circuit first recognized claims of
associational race discrimination in the 2008 case of Holcomb v. Iona
College and then declares, “Holcomb is this Court’s Baldwin [v. Foxx],
dressed in the language of race. Extend Holcomb to same-sex partners and
[circuit precedent holding that sexual orientation discrimination is not
actionable under Title VII] is dead.”176 Consequently, the appellant is asking
the court to untether associational discrimination theory from its racial
moorings, expand the theory to include associational discrimination on the
basis of sex, and then interpret associational sex discrimination as precluding
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. For a circuit that only
recently embraced associational discrimination theory in the specific context
of race, this argument will likely prove a bridge too far.
Second, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in its application
of McDonnell Douglas. According to the appellant, whether a prima facie
case of discrimination has been established — so as to then shift the burden
to the employer to come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the contested action — is a question of law for the trial judge such
that it was error for the court to have entrusted that responsibility to the
jury.177 Had the jury not been involved in this determination, however, the
trial judge may still have defaulted to the reasoning of the early associational
race discrimination cases and held that the appellant was unable to satisfy
the first element of McDonnell Douglas, i.e., membership in a protected
class. Specifically, the trial judge may have concluded that, as a man, the
appellant cannot establish membership in a protected class either in his own
right or derivatively via the protected class status of his romantic associates.
Third, the appellant asserts that he was terminated after acknowledging
his homosexuality to his coworkers — a necessary prerequisite to invoking
the associational-discrimination route, and yet because he was not at that
time married to a person of the same sex, the Second Circuit may well
conclude that he cannot state a viable claim of associational sex
discrimination. Although other circuits have held that the degree of

175. Appellant’s Brief at 33-35, 38, 48, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775); Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, 13-14, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775).
176. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 175, at 48.
177. Id. at 43.
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association between an associator and associatee is irrelevant,178 the Second
Circuit’s decision in Holcomb centered on the most substantial of all
relationships: marriage.179 Thus, the fact that the appellant and his same-sex
partner separated before he began working for the appellee180 may lead the
Second Circuit to find that, as a single person, he is unable to state a
cognizable claim of associational sex discrimination.
Unlike associational discrimination theory, the but-for and genderstereotyping routes are grounded in Supreme Court precedent and have their
origins in the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence. Because the
inclusion of associational discrimination claims will only serve to undermine
these other arguments’ strength while at the same time affording courts
hostile to LGB equality an opportunity to curtail the associationaldiscrimination route’s efficacy via narrow, fact-restricted rulings, the
appellant in Zarda v. Altitude Express — together with the EEOC181 —
should rely exclusively on the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes to
show that the anti-LGB bias he suffered constitutes actionable sex
discrimination under Title VII.

178. See Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513; Drake, 134 F.3d at 884.
179. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139.
180. Joint Appendix – Volume I at 141, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775); Joint Appendix – Volume II at 570, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775).
181. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals invited the EEOC “to brief and argue this case
as amicus curiae.” Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. May 31, 2017). In
its brief, the EEOC continues to advance the associational-discrimination route as a means of
demonstrating that sexual orientation-based employment discrimination constitutes
actionable sex discrimination under Title VII. En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants and in Favor of
Reversal at 10-13, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. June 23, 2017).

